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ABSTRACT
 
This article examines the effects of changes in the dynamics of the American national
business system on industrial relations settlements in the UK subsidiaries of American
multinational corporations (MNCs). While institutionalist analyses of country-of-
origin and host-country effects must take account of changes in national business
systems, such as the rise of the shareholder value ideology in the USA, empirical
analysis reveals a pattern of pathway adjustment rather than radical change in employ-
ment relations at the UK subsidiary level. This suggests that although US MNCs are
embedded within the American business system, their subsidiaries are not passive
 
ciphers but autonomous sites through which influences must pass.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Over the past three years, our reviews (Almond 
 
et al
 
., 2003; Clark 
 
et al
 
., 2002; Muller-
Camen 
 
et al
 
., 2001) have explored several issues in the unfolding debate on multina-
tionals and national business systems. First, we examined relationships between home
and host country influences and the effects of these on industrial relations in
multinational corporations (MNCs). Second, we explored the means by which
industry-specific, that is sector pressures, are mediated by national business systems,
in particular, embedded features of the industrial relations system. Third, we reviewed
the extent to which the neo-liberal shareholder value ideology is becoming embedded
within European business systems and the conflicts and challenges this may bring
forth in national systems of industrial relations. This year, we consolidate these reviews
by examining how contemporary business practice, associated business models and
internal operating procedures within the American business system (ABS) may or may
not influence and impact upon established patterns of industrial relations manage-
ment in British subsidiaries of American MNCs. Equally, we seek to suggest how
established settlements within firm-based employment systems may or may not com-
bine with host-country effects to constrain such innovations.
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Evaluation of the tension between historically embedded features in the ABS and
more dynamic contemporary features of the ABS and the effects of these on the
management of industrial relations in British subsidiaries of American multinationals
is important on four grounds. First, and most substantively, whilst US MNCs are
embedded within the ABS and seek to transfer this influence through subsidiary
operations in host countries, the ABS itself  is very fluid and dynamic. Rhetorically at
least, these characteristics permit American firms the scale and scope to change and
amend business strategies and structures with great rapidity in response to contem-
porary market imperatives and technological influences. It is likely to be the case that
the country-of-origin effect associated with US MNCs reflects a tension between
established patterns of embeddedness and contemporary dynamism within the ABS.
Working out the tension may, over time, change the relative significance of component
elements within 
 
Americanness
 
, including established patterns of industrial relations
management. However, our empirical material may shed light on the tension between
potential innovations associated with 
 
contemporary
 
 country-of-origin effects flowing
from the ABS in relation to established country-of-origin effects in the management
of industrial relations. This point is significant to academics, policy makers and
practitioners alike. Academically, it may demonstrate how US MNCs accommodate
contemporary influences and pressures that emanate within the ABS and transfer
these to subsidiary operations and how they affect established patterns of industrial
relations or how they are constrained by them. Similarly for policy makers and
practitioners, pressures for and innovations within subsidiaries of US MNCs may
become measures of 
 
competitive
 
 best practice in indigenous firms.
 
1
 
 Equally, established
patterns of regulation within subsidiary operations together with host country regu-
lation may constrain pressures for and innovations in management practice associated
with contemporary country-of-origin effects. For example, legal regulation such as
European Works Councils in subsidiary operations may forestall rapid changes in
corporate strategy, whereas information and consultative committees may prevent the
use of innovatory strategies for redundancies, such as ‘culling’ (see below) from finding
acceptance within firm-level employment systems.
Second and related, the evident country-of-origin effect associated with subsidiaries
of US MNCs suggests that these MNCs act as deviant innovators in the management
of industrial relations, challenging established patterns of regulation in host business
systems such as collective bargaining in the UK. However, given the domestically
inspired changes to British industrial relations over the past 20 years non-unionism
can no longer be referred to as an innovation, leading us to suggest that innovations
are more likely to originate from developments in corporate governance, such as the
emergence of shareholder value (see O’Sullivan, 2000) but may nevertheless impact
upon industrial relations.
Third, foreign direct investment (FDI) by US MNCs accounted for at least 44 per
cent and at most 68 per cent of annual FDI in the UK between 1965 and 1998. These
levels are far greater than figures for FDI from other business systems (Dunning, 1998:
291) with FDI by US MNCs in the UK accounting for 14 per cent of all US FDI in
2002 (UNCTAD, 2002). So the sheer size of American FDI in the UK is likely to have
a measurable impact on industrial relations management within and beyond subsid-
iaries of US MNCs.
 
1
 
We have previously noted this with respect to non-unionism in Ireland (Almond 
 
et al
 
., 2003).
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A fourth reason why the tension-bound relationship between established patterns
of embeddedness and contemporary dynamics within the ABS is significant relates to
the potential impact of more determined shareholder value and financial short-
termism on established patterns of industrial relations management within our case
study firms. As we reported last year, shareholder value and financial short-termism
may reinforce the well established preference for non-unionism and union avoidance
in US MNCs (Almond 
 
et al
 
., 2003: 433). More significantly than this, these pressures
may challenge employer commitment to long-term, secure employment and employee
voice mechanisms within welfare capitalist firms too, pushing all varieties of Ameri-
canness in industrial relations management in the direction of lower road employers.
This, too, is significant to policy and practitioner debate. The success of innovatory
business practices—labour flexibility and empowerment, the choice to work long
hours, competitive performance management and associated ‘culling’—was first
brought to prominence by British subsidiaries of US MNCs. Several of these practices
have the potential to lean towards a lower road and politicians and employer groups
such as the British Chambers of Commerce, the Confederation of British Industry,
the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, and the Institute of Directors,
cite measures to regulate these practices to illustrate the ‘burden of red tape’ and
anticompetitive impact of regulation and employment rights associated with the emer-
gent European model of employment. For example, the Institute of Directors esti-
mated that the working time directive cost British business £2.3 billion in 2003
(Financial Times, 2003a). Similarly, in respect of Information and Consultative Com-
mittees, Ministers have continually stressed the consultative nature of these and their
lack of impact on British flexibility and the managerial prerogative (Financial Times,
2003b), whereas the Conservative opposition made the anticompetitive nature of
European regulation a central feature of their European election campaign during
2004. The success of these arguments and supporting evidence is likely to further
legitimise the already dilettante approach of the Blair government to European
employment directives (see also Barnard 
 
et al
 
., 2003).
The diffusion of greater pressures for short-termism is common to both the Amer-
ican and the British business system but the argument we develop suggests that whilst
both systems are examples of liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2000),
there are considerable differences between the two. For example, whilst within both
systems, financial measures of competitiveness such as share price and shareholder
value are vital to create and sustain job creation and labour flexibility in the ABS
functional and numerical flexibility combined with a series of organisational capa-
bilities. In contrast to this, in the UK, competitiveness and flexibility are more gener-
ally defined and relate to openness of the economy, the lightness of regulation therein
and the positive effects of these on job creation. The term ‘parallel tendencies’ cap-
tures the dynamic similarities between the two business systems, but in addition,
establishes the embedded differences between them. Further to this, business systems
more firmly located in the EU stakeholder model where measures of competitiveness
include not only financial imperatives but longer term measures such as functional
flexibility, innovation and a longer term financial horizon are encountering the effects
of these parallel tendencies. However, operating as they do from a state-centric as
opposed to a state-abstentionist tradition, the effects of emergent short-termism are
mediated and managed by the stakeholders in a more consensual manner than in the
UK or the US (see Barnard 
 
et al
 
., 2003: 475). We will examine this issue in more
depth in next year’s review when we compare and contrast the arguments and find-
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ings reported on here with the findings of our colleagues in Germany, Spain and
Ireland.
Accordingly, to flesh out the discussion of contemporary pressures within the ABS
and the potential effects of these within and beyond British subsidiaries of US MNCs,
our review proceeds through three parts. To establish a framework that examines
policy transfer within US MNCs and British subsidiaries and the potential for
tensions within this process, part one briefly outlines embedded features of the ABS
and contemporary influences in business practice. Identifying the dimensions of
embeddedness and more contemporary and dynamic business pressures stimulate
hypothesised links to practice—country-of-origin effects, firm-specific effects and
host-business system effects—in subsidiaries with different styles of decision-making
and industrial relations management. Part two reports on empirical findings from a
four-year study of industrial relations in British subsidiaries of US MNCs to reveal
the effects of contemporary influences on the ABS and how these manifest themselves
in subsidiary operations. Finally, part three places our argument and material on
British subsidiaries of US MNCs within contemporary issues of debate on British
industrial relations and offers some tentative conclusions.
 
THE AMERICANNESS OF BRITISH SUBSIDIARIES OF US MNCs
 
A key theme in research on multinational firms centres on how the behaviour of
MNCs and the management of their subsidiary operations contribute to change and
evolution in host business systems (Ferner, 1997). Our specific focus is the impact of
subsidiaries of US MNCs in the British business system and the institutions of its
industrial relations system; for example, collective bargaining. The literature, in par-
ticular Flanders (1964), Dunning (1998)
 
2
 
 and for a comprehensive review Edwards
and Ferner (2002), suggest that US MNCs have, over the postwar period, acted as
innovators in industrial relations management with many of these innovations flowing
from business models and corporate structures established in and embedded within
the ABS but alien to the British business system. For example, the diffusion of
multidivisional structures for corporate organisation preceded and stimulated the
movement to plant-level collective bargaining in and then beyond British subsidiaries
of US MNCs (see Kipping, 1998). The impact of shareholder value and more deter-
mined pressures for short-termism is, as we noted last year, an innovation that may
have an effect on industrial relations management in European business systems
(Almond 
 
et al
 
., 2003).
To assess this nationality and efficiency effect, we briefly detail what is distinctively
American about the management of US MNCs. This is followed by a discussion of
how the Americanness of US MNCs has sustained a variety of approaches to indus-
trial relations management in their subsidiaries. We then suggest how contemporary
imperatives within the ABS illustrate both the dynamism of the system and the impact
of these imperatives on established approaches to industrial relations management in
British subsidiaries. In summary, we identify shareholder value as a contemporary
dynamic within the ABS that one would expect US MNCs to accommodate at
 
2
 
It is important to point out that Dunning was first published in 1958, and therefore the main bulk of his
empirical material and theoretical arguments relate to the mid-1950s. The 1998 edition does, however,
include a chapter that contrasts his findings from the 1950s with the 1990s; the chapter further develops
and compares and contrasts theoretical arguments between the two periods.
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corporate and subsidiary level relatively quickly resulting in an identifiable impact on
patterns of decision-making.
 
‘Americanness’: the distinctive qualities of US MNCs and their British subsidiaries
 
The ABS is a distinctive model of economic organisation where market relationships
represent the primary mechanism of coordination. Therein, atomistic firms engage
with one another through arm’s-length contractual relations. Historically, this model
underpinned the growth and diffusion of large firms serving mass standardised con-
sumer markets, wherein the market imperatives of growth and survival stimulated
the development of centralised management control systems in production and work
organisation, planning and budgetary control and personnel management. Sum-
marised as a series of ‘organizational capabilities’ (Chandler, 1990), these formalised
organisational bureaucracies saw firms develop further centralised controls over the
management of labour including systematic management tools for job analysis, work
study and the detailed division of labour in mass production systems that combined
with the use of machinery and interchangeable parts (see Braverman, 1974; Edwards,
1979). The fusion of management control systems and dedicated machinery reduced
throughput times and unit labour costs to allow large firms to increase market share
by out-competing more specialised small-scale producers on price, delivery, replace-
ment and repair. In summary, interaction between and within firms and their employ-
ees, as well as labour, financial and product markets are contractually based with very
few legal or regulatory constraints on the conduct of these market relationships
imposed by the American state (Ferner 
 
et al
 
., 2004).
These organisational capabilities provide an enduring legacy that shaped later devel-
opments and innovations, particularly when American firms set up operations over-
seas. In other words, US MNCs are embedded within the institutional structure of
the ABS and transfer aspects of this ‘Americanness’ to their subsidiary operations.
For British subsidiaries, this process of transfer is all the more likely given the domi-
nant position of US MNCs as inward investors in the UK.
 
Varieties of Americanness: industrial relations management
 
The organisational capabilities of American firms maintained by contractual and
market relations, have historically operated in an individualistic ethos that promotes
a strong anti-union mentality among American employers. However, the ABS has
sustained a variety of patterns of industrial relations within unionised ‘New Deal’
employers and non-union employers that range from sophisticated ‘welfare capitalist’
firms which offer employees high commitment management and secure jobs to ‘low-
road’ exploiters of cheap labour. Welfare capitalist employers represent a sophisticated
variety of non-unionism based on encouraging a strong mutual commitment between
the firm and the employee characterised by a philosophical opposition to unionism
(see Foulkes, 1980) and a belief  that the firm, rather than the state or trade unions
should provide for the security of workers. Hence, to substitute for trade unions,
welfare capitalist firms introduce innovative personnel management policies in areas
such as pensions, health care systems and unemployment insurance. Equally, they
pioneered individual performance-related pay, profit-sharing and teamworking
(Jacoby, 1997). They built employees’ psychological commitment by promoting a
strong explicit and inclusive corporate culture and employed social science techniques
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such as employee attitude surveys to keep in touch with employee opinion. However,
where necessary they are prepared to ‘play it tough’ to quash attempts at union
organisation (Jacoby, 1997). In contrast, New Deal employers concede union recog-
nition and bargain in ‘good faith’ with trade unions over legally enforceable contracts
and highly codified collective agreements—‘job control unionism’—that set detailed
grading structures and procedures for grievance and discipline. In many respects, both
varieties rested for success on structural factors such as stable product markets and
the absence of marked business cycles. In recent years, the welfare capitalist model
has been weakened by accelerating technological developments and intense inter-
national competition and both welfare capitalist firms and New Deal employers have
faced crises that have threatened firm-level industrial relations settlements, possibly
blurring the distinction between de-unionising New Deal employers and the non-
union sector. Such a development may push more employers in the direction of low-
road non-unionism where survival in highly competitive markets combines with high
labour intensity and low skills and poor access to training (see Katz and Darbishire,
2000) However, the legacy of welfare capitalism and the New Deal remains in firm-
level employment systems. Here, a tradition of internal labour markets for core
employees and in the role or vision of founding families may combine with host-
country effects to sustain firm-specific employment systems. It is the embeddedness
of these systems that may constrain the impact of contemporary business strategies
which appear at first sight to threaten welfare capitalist or New Deal settlements.
 
Contemporary imperatives in the ABS and British subsidiaries of US MNCs
 
A dominant feature of the ABS that distinguishes Americanness from other business
systems is the significance of centralised operations and organisational capabilities.
These create a pattern of sustained competitive advantage that has enabled large
American firms to out-compete smaller firms in the domestic market and as multi-
nationals out-compete smaller firms in host economies. Witness, for example, the
penetration of consolidation within and exit from motor manufacturing in the UK
during the 20th century through a combination of organisational capabilities in pro-
duction and aggressive merger and acquisition activity. The latter is indicative of a
capability to sustain capital investment and productivity growth via market penetra-
tion that flows from embedded patterns of organisational capability and an emergent
pursuit of shareholder value in the market. This point is important as it illustrates
both the real and the symbolic nature of dominance. Embedded patterns of work
organisation do create a distinctive competitive advantage but in addition ‘dominance’
is likely to be given meaning by the rhetorical and symbolic diffusion of imperatives
and pressures in the ABS to subsidiary operations and indigenous firms in host
economies. So, methods of organising production—volume standardised produc-
tion—and its regulation become dominant if  they invite emulation in other economies,
first, in indigenous firms—the process of Americanisation (see Clark, 1999; Djelic,
1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel, 2002) and then, in subsidiaries of US MNCs—the emer-
gence of Americanness, with the latter acting as a further spur to indigenous firms in
host economies on the grounds of best practice and efficiency (see Dunning, 1998).
Despite the embeddedness of its organisational capabilities, the ABS is also distinc-
tive in that the pattern of contractual and market relations—its market logic—facili-
tates rapid shifts in the form and meaning of its dominance For example, O’Sullivan
(2000) argues that the movement from a ‘retain and reinvest’ managerialist mode of
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
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corporate governance to one that is dominated by a ‘downsize and distribute’ share-
holder value model of corporate governance is significant because of its symbolism,
and not because of its substance. This is the case because the shareholder value model
has no theory of the firm or firm-specific assets, such as its employment system. It is
clear that both of these are necessary for employers to generate profits, the distribution
of which is the focus of shareholder value approaches. In the contemporary period
developments in the financial system such as the growth of institutional investors, the
influence of financial analysts, an aggressive market for corporate control (merger and
acquisitions) and the pursuit of shareholder value have created a renewed emphasis
on financial returns. This may put pressure on or break industrial relations settle-
ments—internal constraints—within welfare capitalist or New Deal firms pushing
each towards a lower road. This pressure may be manifested in the re-defining of
centre–subsidiary relations in terms of subsidiary performance and autonomy or in
broader approaches to industrial relations. A key point that we tease out in this respect
is the degree to which such pressures are rhetorical and sustained but symbolic in
terms of corporate discourse and catch-all as contemporary drivers of business strat-
egy within and beyond British subsidiaries. The previous point is significant because
O’Sullivan (2000) establishes that the theory of shareholder value, being essentially
concerned with claims over profit, has no productive dimension, an absence that
actually encourages stability in patterns of firm-specific settlements such as industrial
relations.
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
BRITISH SUBSIDIARIES OF US MNCs
 
The findings presented here are based on data from the British component of a study
of industrial relations management in US MNCs across four European countries—
Britain, Germany, Ireland and Spain. The aim of the research was to identify the
influence of the US business system on the management of industrial relations in US
MNCs and to evaluate whether ‘Americanness’ was manifested in different ways in
different host environments. In order to establish linkages and understand processes,
a qualitative method was adopted, based on eight in-depth case studies. The principal
case studies are indicated in the table below. For reasons of confidentiality, pseud-
onyms are used throughout.
 
The case study companies
 
Most of these companies are major players in their respective industries, therefore our
sample is representative of larger MNCs, the majority of which are long-established
in the UK—with the exception of Logistico, which recently entered the UK market,
along with other European markets, via acquisition of brownfield sites—rather than
establishing new greenfield sites (Table 1).
 
Established approaches to industrial relations in the UK and US
 
The established approaches to collective industrial relations in these companies are
presented in Table 2. As can be seen, in the US, a number of the firms (CPGco, ITco,
Household) fit the welfare capitalist archetype. In a further two (EngServs, Pharma-
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chem), there has been some union influence within generally non-collective industrial
relation strategies, while Engco1 and Logistico can be considered as fitting the New
Deal archetype. Finally, Engco2 is a more complex case; historically the firm has
championed a relatively tame form of trade unionism, shorn of links to the wider
labour movement. This represents a variant of welfare capitalism, because it clearly
had the aim of avoiding the national unions. It should be noted that none of the firms
reported on here have historically taken an explicitly low-road approach to industrial
relations in their domestic operations.
 
Collective industrial relations in British subsidiaries
 
Of the three welfare capitalist firms, all of them have historically resisted unionisation
in the UK, although CPGco eventually conceded union recognition following several
years of struggle in the 1960s and 1970s. In the two partially unionised companies,
the same pattern of opposition to union influence, where this is feasible, is essentially
replicated. The one New Deal firm that is well established in the UK (Engco1) has
historically acquiesced with British pluralism, as has Engco2. Logistico’s entry into
Britain is too recent to talk of an established approach. Where UK operations were
only partly unionised or non-union, this reflected a non-union ethos transmitted by
the centre to world-wide operations, generally accompanied by sophisticated pater-
nalist measures that attempted to reduce the probability of union organisation. The
example of ITco is instructive here. During the 1970s, unions were pressing to recruit
members and succeeded in using the quasi-statutory union recognition procedure in
place at the time to force the issue. British managers campaigned strongly against
 
Table 1: The case study companies
 
Codename Sector
Global
employment
(000s)
UK
employment
(000s)
Established
in the
UK since
CPGco Manufacturing:
consumer and
professional products
75 3 1880s
Engco1 Manufacturing: capital
engineering equipment
69 2 1950s
Engco2 Manufacturing: capital
engineering equipment
28 5 1970s
EngServs Process plant
construction services
11 2 1920s
Household Manufacturing:
consumer household
products
10 0.7 1910s
ITco IT services 365 20 1950s
Logistico Logistics services 360 4 1990s
Pharmachem Manufacturing:
chemicals and
pharmaceuticals
13.7 0.15 1910s
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
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recognition, stressing the company’s paternalist policies; one of those involved in the
managerial campaign reported that they had told the workforce that ‘you’re joining
ITco; ITco will look after you from cradle to grave’. These tactics worked, in that there
was a large majority against union recognition. A senior manager who had been
involved in the company’s campaign described the ‘halo effect’ that they had enjoyed
for some time following this victory in the eyes of corporate HQ:
 
So we were heroes to the States. Here was the system, this great system which was the creation of [the
founding family], this was the system being tested. So we had letters of congratulation, ‘wonderful
achievement’, ‘shows the system works’. It was a vindication that had never been attained before,
because there had been no vote on the ITco system [Retired UK HR manager, ITco].
 
Although there appears to be a reasonable degree of correlation here between US
and UK approaches, what is more interesting, is the extent to which policy has
changed in recent years, and the extent to which this can be ascribed to a strategy
emanating from the country of origin, rather than to secular developments in the UK.
Particularly, given the apparent constraints of the New Deal industrial relations
system and the difficulties involved in maintaining the more paternalist policies
involved in the welfare capitalist model, how has the nature of Americanness in
industrial relations changed?
 
Challenges to firm-based employment systems?
 
Most of the companies have been subjected to a variety of pressures with the potential
to undermine their firm-based employment systems in the US and elsewhere, be they
welfare capitalist or New Deal.
In a number of the cases, changes in product markets were the most obvious factor
provoking change. CPGco and ITco, in particular, lost stable monopolistic positions
as the nature of the product market altered substantially. In other cases, particularly
the engineering companies, pressures primarily arose not from changes in the nature
of the product, but from a marked internationalisation of competition, particularly
from Japanese competitors. In the case of Engco1, this new competition for the US
domestic market was a strong factor in the firm’s rejection of New Deal pattern
bargaining, as it argued that other firms within the sector were not facing the same
degree of pressure from international competition due to import restrictions in, for
example, the automobiles sector.
The exacerbation of the shareholder value ideology as a 
 
modus operandi
 
 for public
quoted firms in the USA (O’Sullivan, 2000) was also a factor in most of the firms.
Although it is hard to disentangle this from the market pressures cited above, in both
CPGco and ITco ‘outsiders’, with reputations of managing for shareholder value, were
appointed as CEOs during the 1990s. The same occurred in Engco2, in this case
following a failed hostile takeover bid. In all of these cases, subsidiary managers were
well versed in pressures to produce quarterly results.
To these pressures may be added more specific issues and developments in industrial
relations, particularly the reduction of trade union strength in the USA where the
decline both of New Deal models and of welfare capitalist paternalism are part of the
response to pressures external to industrial relations listed above. Equally, decline is
greatly facilitated by the difficulties unions face in organising in the US, many of which
relate to the decline in the manufacturing workforce; the increased international
mobility of capital; and the collapse of political support for the New Deal model.
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Unsurprisingly, the main pillar of firm-level employment systems that has failed to
survive the developments above has been policies on employment security, with sig-
nificant downsizing and restructuring being a widespread phenomenon. This devel-
opment has had particularly strong effects on the two most stereotypical welfare
capitalist firms, CPGco and ITco, which had, prior to the late 1980s, avoided redun-
dancies. Equally, in unionised companies such as Engco1, increased product market
competition, particularly in this case, the challenge from Japan, has been a significant
driver behind the firm’s rejection of the New Deal model in the US.
Yet, if  the binary split between welfare capitalism and New Deal-ism is no longer
an appropriate characterisation of the employment policies of those large American
firms that eschew a simple ‘low-road’ model, it is less clear what changes and innova-
tions have either impacted on or been accommodated by these approaches. As our
interest here is primarily in employment relations in the UK operations, we need to
examine the extent to which these firms exhibit some form of ‘contemporary Ameri-
canness’ at their British subsidiaries.
 
Established employment systems in British subsidiaries
 
One complicating factor here is the degree of centralisation of policy on industrial
relations and other aspects of human resources (HR). Comparing, for instance,
CPGco and ITco once again, their objective conditions are in some ways fairly similar.
Both are traditional welfare capitalist firms, both have seen the erosion of product
market monopoly, and subsidiary managers in both have strongly emphasised the
pressures brought about by the firms’ commitment to shareholder value. Yet, whereas
ITco’s strong historical non-union ethos is transferred to international operations
wherever possible (similar policies apply, albeit less rigidly in Household and Phar-
machem), CPGco seems to be primarily interested in preventing unionisation in the
US. There is no central direction of subsidiary union recognition policy, as managers
at both European and corporate headquarters underline that the parent company does
not ‘understand’ collective issues. Similarly, Engco2, which is not specifically anti-
union in the US but prefers to deal with ‘independent’ unions, gives no global direc-
tion on collective recognition issues.
Global anti-union policies exist outside the welfare capitalist group. Engco1, per-
haps unsurprisingly in the light of its battles with trade unions in the US, has a clause
in its publicly available world-wide code of conduct of trying to create the right
environment where employees do not feel the need for ‘third parties’. In contrast to
this, Logistico, where the union in the US is currently too strong to be challenged
directly, has a ‘recommendation’ to minimise the potential for organisation of unions.
If  a European subsidiary felt it had specific reasons to break with this recommenda-
tion, it would have to present a case to the European HR Director. EngServs, the most
decentralised of our firms on all other aspects of HR and business coordination, has
no formal international policy on union recognition, but UK managers reported
resistance from central managers to the establishment of a European Works Council,
on the grounds that this could be ‘a bridge to the unions’.
In terms of management–union relations, the overall picture is one of relative
stability (see Table 3). In spite of the economic and financial challenges of the last two
decades and the political window of opportunity that Thatcherism presented for
attempts to challenge unionised settlements, moves away from collective models have
predominantly been at the margins; for example, unions without strong workforce
support were derecognised at Engco1 and Pharmachem. A collectivised pattern of
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industrial relations is most prevalent at CPGco, in spite of its non-union approach in
the US and the prolonged fight against recognition challenges in the UK; unions now
appear well organised, and there is widespread consultation and UK managers show
no interest in changing the status quo. In some of the unionised companies, as in the
British economy more widely, there are indications that the union role has been
marginalised due to the introduction of more individualist policies in the areas of
teamworking and employee involvement, but there is little support for the idea that
this was the motive behind the introduction of such policies. In spite of its derecog-
nition of unions representing salaried groups, Engco1 appears to have contradicted
formal global policy in not challenging the shopfloor union, and seems content to
follow the standard British pattern within the engineering sector. Finally, ITco has
retained a strong and successful opposition to trade unions within its core businesses,
but its recent entry into the IT outsourcing market has resulted in the need to
accommodate trade unions in some transfers of undertakings (protection of employ-
ment) and here British managers reported on the advantages of dealing with unions.
While this is not a dramatic development in terms of ITco UK generally, interviews
with retired managers suggest that the very existence of unions in the firms for whom
ITco takes over the IT function would, until recent product market difficulties, have
been enough to prevent investment in such markets. In this respect, we can conclude
that tighter competitive conditions in the UK prevent strategic choice and established
preferences in approaches to industrial relations from constraining investment activity.
 
Other innovatory developments and changes to employment relations settlements at 
British subsidiaries?
 
Naturally, a discussion on change in industrial relations among US MNCs needs to
go beyond the totemic issue of collective recognition and consider other areas of HR.
In examining the nature of contemporary ‘Americanness’, therefore, we now turn to
the substantive issues of pay and performance management, and work organisation,
as highlighted by Dunning (1998).
On the management of pay, the majority of the firms studied have a worldwide
system of grades applying to the workforce as a whole. However, tensions remain
between pressures for uniformity and host country autonomy. Although definitions
of job grades tend to be centralised and ‘global’ in nature, some autonomy remains
in wage setting. This is greater for non-managerial workers, and where there is collec-
tive bargaining in the British subsidiary.
Reflecting a more general trend, both in the USA (Dessler, 2003) and elsewhere,
there has been a move away from a multiplicity of narrow pay grades to ‘broadband-
ing’ (CPGco, Engco1, EngServs, Household, ITco). However, with the exception of
ITco, this has not been accompanied by any measures such as competence-based pay
designed to allow some visible form of salary progression within flatter organisational
structures. Thus, for shopfloor workers in several of these firms, there is little chance
of salary progression other than through promotion to supervisory or management
roles. Here, then, specific innovation in British subsidiaries is limited to attempts to
simplify grading structures worldwide.
The majority of the firms here are perhaps more innovative with regard to reward
for individual performance. Unsurprisingly, all the case study firms had a form of
individual performance-related pay, with some (ITco, Household, EngServs) using it
throughout the hierarchy rather than merely for managers. In nearly all cases, the
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
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nature of individual performance management was strongly led by global manage-
ment rather than devolved to the UK subsidiary. Significantly, a number of companies
(CPGco, Engco2, ITco) used performance against competencies, corporate values or
personal qualities and characteristics (e.g. leadership, valuing diversity, etc.) as mod-
ifiers of individual merit pay. In this way, the firms attempted to use remuneration to
reinforce and sometimes to change corporate values.
One prominent initiative, reflected in increased ‘marketisation’ in the employment
relationship, was the use in several cases of ‘forced’ distributions in performance
management, such that a certain percentage of workers had to be placed in the highest
and lowest performing categories. The use of forced distributions by US MNCs
becomes particularly significant when the data gathered are not only used to determine
pay increases, but also affect the job security of the individual. The dismissal of those
individuals with poor performance rankings may occur in two ways. The stricter
means is the General Electric model (Lawler, 2002), where the 10 per cent with the
poorest results are liable to be dismissed, or ‘culled’. This model was introduced
explicitly in Engco2 as part of a drive to make the organisation more focused on
performance, although there was significant managerial resistance to the use of this
policy in the UK. Elsewhere, while there is no explicit policy of ‘culling’ the lowest
performers in a forced distribution, it is clear that those in the bottom groups are the
most likely candidates for redundancy in the event of downsizing (this was most clearly
the case in ITco). This model, although legally questionable in a European context,
depending as it does on the American concept of ‘employment at will’, clearly repre-
sents a move away from the ‘last in first out’ model which has historically been a
feature of large firms with strong internal labour markets as part of firm-specific
settlements. The definition of ‘fairness’ in who should be made redundant has clearly
been altered, marking a further move away from the assumptions of welfare capitalism
or the New Deal model within which the subsidiaries remain encased.
On work organisation, despite the rhetoric of teamworking, there was little sign
that the subsidiaries of US MNCs were more innovative than their UK counterparts
in the same sector. Indeed, rather than a ‘new’ form of country-of-origin effect
emerging from the challenges of recent years in standard manufacturing settings such
as CPGco, Engco1 and Engco2, the legacy of Taylorism remained strongly apparent.
Tasks tended to be fragmented and executed under significant management direction.
There was a significant degree of subsidiary autonomy over the pace and detail of
teamworking programmes, but underlying controls over product design and produc-
tion technology continued to place limits on the extent of team autonomy. Relatedly,
there were some signs of moves towards more sophisticated but sector-specific strat-
egies of work organisation in high-skill sectors such as engineering services where
EngServs operates. However, our fieldwork suggested that this resulted from sector
and nationality effects, not central direction from the corporate headquarters (see
Colling and Clark, 2002).
In summary it is clear that contemporary pressures from the ABS are transmitted
through to British subsidiaries. However, these pressures display a relative lack of
effect on collective industrial relations where it is present suggesting that centralised
opposition to trade unions is, in some of the cases, an already established country-of-
origin effect. There is some evidence of increased centralisation possibly resulting from
greater pressures towards shareholder value, for example, reduced employment secu-
rity, increased marketisation of pay and performance pushing the overall management
of subsidiaries towards a contractual approach and further away from one based on
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status; but our cases suggest that this movement can be accommodated within existing
approaches to industrial relations.
 
INNOVATION, INTERNATIONALISATION AND 
BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
 
A fundamental premise of our research on British subsidiaries of US MNCs is that
US MNCs are embedded within the assumptions, practices and contemporary dynam-
ics of the ABS. Following on from this, US MNCs are likely to transfer aspects of
‘Americanness’ to their operations abroad where within the global and increasingly
internationalised economic system, the USA occupies a dominant position, reinforced
by its military and political strength since 1945. This dominance is likely to encourage
other national business systems to ‘import’ American models. To evaluate the dynam-
ics and contradictions of this process for British industrial relations, we engage with
two wider issues of debate to further examine our argument; namely the ‘productivity
gap’ and the relationship between short-termism, shareholder value and organisa-
tional capabilities. Our reasoning for making this argument is twofold; first, to place
our findings on British subsidiaries of US MNCs more firmly in the context of the
British business system; and second, to demonstrate that further research on the
details of the transfer process of Americanness within US MNCs and indigenous firms
is necessary.
 
The productivity gap
 
What is now termed the ‘productivity gap’ was first identified by Dunning in the 1950s
(1985; 1996; 1998). Concerned with the recovery of the British economy from the
Second World War and its longer term performance, Dunning argued that the transfer
of American managerial know-how would be beneficial to the British economy if  the
distinctive characteristics of American management style and strategies could be
transferred to subsidiaries of US MNCs and indigenous firms. Dunning (1998) further
hypothesised that if  this succeeded in narrowing the productivity gap between the two
business systems, the transfer process would demonstrate that much of this superior
performance rested on the adoption of a series of organisational capabilities developed
by American management. Dunning demonstrated that American subsidiaries tended
to have higher levels of productivity and more orderly patterns of personnel manage-
ment and industrial relations than British firms in the same sector. Dunning’s (1998)
argument is significant to contemporary debates because his findings reveal that
component elements within what is now termed human resources management
(HRM)—incentive schemes, profit sharing, employee stock option plans (ESOPs),
group work (teamwork), group and individual lump-sum bonuses (performance-
related pay) and ‘worker assessments’ (appraisals)—were well developed in British
subsidiaries in the 1950s. This suggests that the train of innovation associated with
US MNCs has a long pedigree but takes some time to spread to indigenous firms and
the long train of diffusion indicates the presence of host country constraints within
the British industrial relations system during the postwar period. Efforts to remove
or heavily regulate these constraints that were introduced by the Thatcher govern-
ments from 1979 not only failed to encourage the diffusion of more developmental
HR policies in indigenous firms but resulted in the dominance of American firms in
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
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many sectors. More significantly than this, the UK’s productivity differential with the
United States remains substantial at around 38 per cent (Financial Times, 2004; Nolan
and Slater, 2003: 76). So British subsidiaries of US MNCs are industrial relations
innovators and these innovations do connect with embedded patterns of organisa-
tional capabilities that constitute a key source of sustained competitive advantage over
British firms. However, the diffusion of HR policies and contemporary innovations
such as downsizing and shareholder value in indigenous firms may not necessarily
combine with organisational capabilities but the tradition of ‘unscientific manage-
ment’ preferred by British employers (Clark, 1999; 2001; Hyman, 2003). Thus whilst
Dunning’s arguments about the diffusion of US managerial strategies and style appear
at first sight convincing, the diffusion of these within British firms is unlikely to raise
efficiency levels to an American standard. This conclusion, although partly specula-
tive, raises a further qualification to Dunning’s hypothesis; it is more likely that the
tradition of British management is a more significant host country constraint than
organised labour to the successful diffusion of American management techniques
within indigenous firms. For example, commenting on the new research agenda of
HRM and performance in British firms, Nolan and O’Donnell (2003: 505) argue that
this is likely as HRM appears embedded within established management systems in
British-based firms rather than making them more American; that is, combine them
with a series of organisational capabilities. More critically than this, it is important
not to over-hypothesise about the adoption of sophisticated HRM policies in the ABS;
for example, Kochan and Osterman (1994) suggest that this is less likely to be the case
in the absence of reform in the ABS. It follows from these arguments that the embed-
ded organisational capabilities (production management, work organisation and cen-
tralised control of personnel and industrial relations) associated with managerial
capitalism are more likely to secure American competitive advantage than HRM,
sophisticated or not. Our research findings on US subsidiaries are unable to offer any
definitive conclusion on this point because we lack comparative data on British firms
in the same sectors and this research gap points to the value of research that matches
pairs of British and American firms in the same sector.
 
Shareholder value and organisational capabilities
 
Whilst O’Sullivan (2000) is often credited with pointing to the contemporary signifi-
cance of shareholder value and the impact of this on how American firms make
effective strategic choices that aim to maintain embedded sources of competitive
advantage, these pressures are not necessarily new in the British business system.
Borrowing from Thompson (2003), this points to the possibility of a theoretical
discontinuity in the evaluation of short-termism and shareholder value in that short-
term pressures are already embedded within the British business system. American-
ness suggests a pattern of innovation and change inspired by the transfer and then
more widespread diffusion of business and work practices first introduced in Ameri-
can MNCs. More pertinently for our specific research findings on the question of
innovation from the ABS, one of our key hypotheses laid out in the section ‘The
Americanness of British Subsidiaries of US MNCs’ is that US MNCs are innovative
both in the particular area of industrial relations and HR and business practices more
generally, with the latter having significant implications for industrial relations. Whilst
this argument appears convincing in respect of contemporary innovations such as the
emergence of shareholder value and more determined short-termism, on closer exam-
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ination, the argument may be less convincing. By this we mean that firm-specific
employment systems retain the legacies of welfare capitalism and New Deal
approaches to industrial relations; in particular, this includes the legacy of more
pluralist approaches to industrial relations, sometimes reluctantly, sometimes volun-
tarily introduced in British subsidiaries.
There is some evidence in our case study material to suggest that internal settle-
ments within American subsidiaries, whether they are New Deal or welfare capitalist,
have been put under pressure by proposals for more determined financial engineering.
But as Table 3 illustrates in several cases, internal settlements have proved relatively
resilient in tempering such pressures. This leads us to the conclusion that as an
innovation, the emergence of shareholder value and more determined short-termism
within British subsidiaries of US MNCs is only as significant as the existing pressures
on indigenous firms embedded within the British business system.
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
A significant feature of the ABS is the organisational capability of American business
which tends to have centralised systems of personnel management and industrial
relations rolled out by high profile well-resourced HR functions such as those reported
on in our case study firms. In MNCs, these departments seek to transfer aspects of
this Americanness to overseas subsidiaries, which in turn act as innovators in host
business systems for indigenous firms. However, our evidence suggests that the picture
is necessarily more complicated than this for subsidiaries. This is the case because
British subsidiaries, whilst they may reflect Americanness, become part of a wider
firm-specific employment system that incorporates host-country effects such as col-
lective bargaining in otherwise anti-union firms. Similarly, in respect of contemporary
pressures transmitted from the ABS, firm-specific employment systems are in part
sustained by the legacy of welfare capitalism or New Deal approaches to industrial
relations. This leads us to the interim conclusion that host-country effects and the
embeddedness of welfare capitalism and New Deal influences may act as constraints
on the smooth transmission of contemporary business pressures from the ABS to
British subsidiaries.
The arguments and evidence cited in the section ‘Innovation, Internationalisation
and British Industrial Relations’ suggest that subsidiaries of US MNCs are innovators
in the field of personnel and industrial relations, business models and business strat-
egies more broadly defined. However, whilst the organisational constraints imposed
on the managerial prerogative by British trade unions are now marginal, the legacy
of unscientific management in British firms remains. As a result of this, personnel and
industrial relations innovations in British firms first aired in subsidiaries of US MNCs
are less likely to combine with a pattern of sustained competitive advantage that
follows from embedded organisational capabilities in US MNCs. Perversely, our argu-
ment leads us to speculate that in some cases, the Americanness of British subsidiaries
of US MNCs that incorporates organisational capabilities within wider but firm-
specific employment systems are better equipped to protect employees from the con-
sequences of contemporary business practices than those found in British employers.
In summary, for researchers, there is a danger that reference to O’Sullivan’s (2000)
work may become a catch-all explanation that loses sight of complex embedded
features in business systems and the impact of these on industrial relations. This points
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.
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to a need for more detailed empiric research on the diffusion of Americanness, par-
ticularly the impact of shareholder value as a business driver in the contemporary
period. Thus, whilst we suggest that in broadly defined patterns of industrial relations
settlement at the level of the firm, more determined short-termism has not led to an
explicit lower road; it is necessary to examine in more detail the changes within
established patterns of industrial relations management in US MNCs. We intend to
report on this in future publications under three broad categories. First, whilst we thus
far are reporting on a pattern of pathway adjustment rather than radical change, the
pattern of adjustment within a defined settlement could be more significant than the
maintenance of a pluralist or welfare capitalist approach. Second, a more detailed
interrogation of O’Sullivan (2000) suggests that a more questioning approach to the
country-of-origin effect that focuses on internal management debate over the effects
of reforming industrial relations settlements will prove fruitful. That is, one that
focuses on the absence of innovation in industrial relations management but which
nevertheless disentangles the effects of shareholder value and movements to lower-
road approaches as separate issues. Finally, to assess the impact of shareholder value
in a more rounded way it will be necessary to examine matched pairs of British firms
and US MNCs in the same sector or examine changes in industrial relations manage-
ment at plants recently acquired by US MNCs. In the absence of these to further
substantiate our arguments in this review we will report on the details of pathway
adjustment in our cases across the UK, Ireland, Germany and Spain.
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